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IV 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO BAR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THIS CONTRACT. 
This is a case where there is no evidence of fraud, and indeed, no possible 
allegation of fraud. The evidence of record is undisputed that the parties intended that the 
Agreement cover the entire 3.67-Acre Parcel. (R. 454, Finding of Fact No. 1). The evidence 
of record is undisputed that the parties had agreed that the price for the 3.67-Acre Parcel would 
be determined by a clearly established method. (See infra, pps. 4-6). Despite this undisputed 
evidence, Russell is attempting to use the Statute of Frauds as a shield to breach his contract 
without consequences. The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is not to allow one to avoid 
admitted and undisputed obligations. As has been stated by this Court: 
We note that the purpose of the statute of frauds is that in important 
matters [involving transfers of real property] the parties should be protected 
against frauds and perjuries, (citations omitted). It is not to prevent the 
performance or the enforcement of oral contracts that have in fact been made; it 
is not to create a loophole of escape for dishonest repudiators. Therefore, we 
should always be satisfied with "some note or memorandum" that is adequate, 
when considered with the admitted facts, the surrounding circumstances and all 
. . . evidence, to convince the court that there is no serious possibility of 
consummating a fraud by enforcement, (citations omitted) 
English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah App. 1991). When the existence of 
the contract has been admitted, the statute of frauds is waived. Bentlev v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617 
(Utah 1984). 
The property to be sold by the contract at issue in this case is not in question. 
The method for determining the price to be paid is not uncertain. The Statute of Frauds was 
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simply not designed to allow Russell to escape his undisputed contractual obligations. 
A. WHAT PROPERTY WAS TO B E SOLD BY THE AGREEMENT IS NOT IN 
QUESTION. 
In the face of substantial Utah authority, Russell has conceded that parol evidence 
is admissible to clarify what property was to meant to be described in a written agreement for 
the sale of real property. (Russell's Brief, p. 14). This concession is consistent with the trial 
court's Finding of Fact No. 1 (R. 454) and Russell's own admissions throughout this litigation 
that the real property that is the subject of the Agreement between the parties is the 3.67-Acre 
Parcel. 
Russell goes on, however, ignoring his own admissions and the trial court's 
factual findings, to assert that parol evidence of a collateral agreement is not admissible to prove 
how the parties decided to describe the real property. (Russell's Brief, pps. 14-16). In 
presumed support of that proposition, Russell has cited to three cases, Davison v. Robbins, 30 
Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, (1973); Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987); 
and Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). The first two of these cases 
do not support Russell's position, and the third case actually contradicts Russell's proposition. 
The Davison and Vasels courts rejected the written contracts in those cases, not because of 
collateral agreements that the parties had already made, but because the final legal description 
(in both cases) was contingent upon future agreement between the parties. In Pitcher, however, 
the contract was rejected because the extrinsic evidence showed that, contrary to the statements 
in the written contract, no collateral agreement had been made. The written language of the 
Pitcher contract had provided for the sale of 30 acres of 189 acres owned by seller "as indicated 
by map." No map was ever shown to the buyer, a fact the Pitcher court could only have 
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determined based on parol evidence. With no evidence of any collateral agreement as to what 
map would govern the sales contract, the Pitcher court rejected the sales contract as 
unenforceable. It follows that had parol evidence shown that the parties had agreed upon a 
governing map, the contract would have been upheld. Thus, contrary to Russell's position, Utah 
law does allow parol evidence of collateral agreements to be introduced to prove how the parties 
decided to describe the real property. 
But proof of a collateral agreement as to how the parties intended to describe the 
real property is not necessary in this case, for there simply is no dispute that the Agreement was 
intended to cover the entire 3.67-Acre Parcel. The statute of frauds is a defense that is waived 
by an admission of the existence of the contract. Bentlev v. Potter, supra. The trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 1 (R. 454) found that the entire 3.67-Acre Parcel was covered by the 
Agreement, and Russell has conceded such throughout this litigation. (See, e.g., R. 124, %). 
All of the lots on the 3.67-Acre Parcel were subject to Coulter & Smith's option to purchase. 
(See footnote 3, Coulter & Smith's Brief). Any collateral agreement between Coulter & Smith 
and Russell regarding the number (and size) of lots to be developed on the 3.67-Acre Parcel is 
irrelevant to a determination of what property was the subject of the Agreement. The entire 
3.67-Acre Parcel was subject to the Agreement. Where, as here, there is no dispute as to what 
property is to be transferred, the Statute of Frauds cannot apply to attempt to avoid the 
Agreement.1 
1
 Without citing to any authority that it makes a difference, Russell attempts to make much 
of the fact that the size of the lots had not yet been determined at the time the Agreement was 
made. But the size of the lots is irrelevant, for it is undisputed that Coulter & Smith had an 
option to purchase the entire 3.67-Acre Parcel, including all of the lots developed thereon, 
regardless of their size. While Russell has attempted to distinguish Bellevue College v. Greater 
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B. THE METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE PRICE TO B E PAID FOR THE 
PROPERTY IS NOT UNCERTAIN. 
The only term not contained in the Agreement between Coulter & Smith and 
Russell was the exact number of lots that would eventually be developed on the 3.67-Acre 
Parcel. Ignoring the agreement between the parties that the number of lots would be the 
maximum allowable by law, Russell argues that the Statute of Frauds has been violated because 
the contingency as to how many lots would eventually be developed renders the price to be paid 
for the 3.67-Acres uncertain. (Russell Brief, pp. 16-17). 
Russell's argument fails because the parties had undisputedly agreed that the total 
price to be paid was contingent on what zoning Sandy City would eventually approve. The 
parties' agreement as to price is implied in the language of the Agreement that annexation and 
zoning was required in order for the lots to be developed. By implication, once zoning approval 
was obtained, the number of lots to be developed, and thus the price to be paid, could be 
established. See, English v. Standard Optical Co., supra, (essential element of rental amount 
can be determined by implication). Once Sandy City's zoning decision is made and the 
approved number of lots is established, the total purchase price for the 3.67-Acre Parcel is easily 
Omaha Realty Co., 217 Neb. 183, 348 N.W.2d 837 (1987) on this basis, the distinction is 
without a difference. In Bellevue, the court was able to determine the location of the disputed 
lot from examining preliminary plats (and, incidently, by relying on extrinsic evidence outside 
of the parties' written agreement). But the location of the lots subject to the parties' Agreement 
in this case is unquestioned - all of the lots were to be located on the 3.67-Acre Parcel. 
Examination of a preliminary plat to determine the location is completely unnecessary. 
Moreover, the option was to purchase a parcel of real estate, not etchings on a plat mat. The 
3.67-Acre Parcel remained the same, regardless of the number and/or size of the lots. Cf., 
Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649 P.2d 66 (Utah 1982) (specific performance to purchase lot 
would be allowed even if final size and configuration of lot differed somewhat from parties' 
original agreement). 
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calculated; $26,500.00 times the number of lots developed. When a contract sets forth a 
cognizable formula by which the agreed purchase price can be readily ascertained, there is no 
violation of the Statute of Frauds. Dahm v. Miele. 523 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (1988); Cage 
Realty, Inc. v. Hanna. 881 S.W.2d 254, 255 (Mo. 1994). And providing that a third party be 
the gauge by which the price is established is permissible as a matter of law. Jacobsen v. Cox, 
115 Utah 102, 116; 202 P.2d 714, 722 (Utah 1949).2 
Moreover, the material term of price is no more sacred a term than the material 
term of an adequate legal description. As Russell has conceded, parol evidence is admissible 
to prove what property was to meant to be described in a written agreement for the sale of real 
property. Similarly, parol evidence is admissible to prove the price if the written agreement is 
ambiguous. In the case before this Court, the unrebutted testimony of Coulter & Smith was that 
the parties had agreed they would seek the maximum number of lots from governmental 
authorities, hoping that they could develop eight to ten lots. (R. 217-19, 15, R. 344, f 10). The 
Agreement provides that Coulter & Smith would pay $26,500.00 per lot, and that the parties 
would "[work] in concert" to facilitate zoning and other development concerns. Coulter & 
Smith had an option to buy all of the lots, not just some of the lots. (Footnote 3, Coulter & 
Smith's Brief). The parol evidence unequivocally establishes that the price to be paid for the 
2
 Moore & Associates Realty, Inc. v. Arrowhead at Vail, 892 P.2d 367 (Colo.App. 1994), 
cited by Russell on p. 17 of his Brief, is inapposite. In that case, there was no evidence that 
the parties had agreed on a mechanism by which they or a third party would determine the 
number of condominium units to be built. In the absence of such an agreement, it is apparent 
that the total purchase price could not be determined. In the case before this court, however, 
since Coulter & Smith's and Russell's agreement as to how the price was to be determined can 
be found within the Agreement's provision that zoning was first required. Thus, the total 
purchase price to be paid can be readily ascertained. 
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3.67-Acre Parcel was $26,500.00 times the number of lots that would eventually be approved. 
Thus, the price to be paid by Coulter & Smith to Russell, being completely capable of 
determination, does not violate the Statute of Frauds. 
Finally, there simply was no dispute between these parties about how the price 
was to be determined. Russell introduced nothing to counter Coulter & Smith's evidence on this 
issue. As set forth above, the purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to protect parties from fraud 
and perjury. It is not prevent enforcement of an admitted contract where there is no "serious 
possibility of consummating a fraud by enforcement." English v. Standard Optical Co., supra 
at 616. The Statute of Frauds is not designed to "create a loophole of escape for dishonest 
repudiators." Id. Here, where there are no possible allegations of fraud, and there is no 
evidence of fraud, Russell cannot use the Statute of Frauds to breach his contract without 
consequences. 
C. COULTER & SMITH'S PART PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT 
ESTOPS RUSSELL FROM RELYING ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
In a further effort to avoid performance of his contractual obligations, Russell 
denies that the work Coulter & Smith performed in developing the 3.67-Acre Parcel constitutes 
sufficient part performance to take the Agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. (Russell Brief, 
pps. 18-24). Russell's argument is based on Coleman v. Dillman. 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981), 
which court held that when part performance is predicated on possession, the purchaser must 
prove (1) actual possession with the seller's consent; (2) beneficial improvements to the land; 
(3) consideration; and (4) that all of the foregoing were exclusively referable to the oral contract. 
Id. at 715. Russell's argument is misplaced, however, for Coulter & Smith has not predicated 
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its part performance on possession of the land. Instead, Coulter & Smith's part performance 
was of the Agreement's requirements that it develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel. 
Specific performance based on part performance does not require that the buyer 
take possession of the land. For example, in LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 26 Utah 2d 
158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971), the buyer had advanced $44,000.00 toward development of the real 
property interest that was the subject of the parties' oral agreement to convey. The Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that the advancement of the funds toward 
development was "sufficient part performance of the oral contract to remove it from the bar of 
the statute." Id. at 1041. In Baldwin v. Vantage Corp.. 676 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1984), part 
performance of an oral contract for conveyance of seven lots was sufficient to remove the 
contract from the statute of frauds where the buyer had already fully paid for and received 
conveyances of three of the lots. And in Brinton v. Van Cott. 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218 (1893), 
the buyer's sacrifice of her plans of future independence and continued performance of service 
was deemed to be sufficient part performance to remove the oral contract from Statute of 
Frauds. In none of these cases did any of the buyers take possession of the disputed land. 
Instead, the buyers' part performance of their obligations under the contracts was sufficient to 
remove these oral contracts from the Statute of Frauds. 
Russell's argument that Coulter & Smith's development efforts were not 
"exclusively referable" to the Agreement must also fail. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
. . . where the existence of the oral contract is established by an admission of the 
party resisting specific performance or by competent evidence independent of the 
acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts of part performance must 
be exclusively] referable to the oral contract is satisfied. . (citing Jones v. Jones, 
333 Mo. 428, 63 S.W.2d 146, 90 A.L.R. 219, [1933] Higgins v. Exchange Nat'l 
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Bank, 142 Misc. 69, 253 N.Y.S. 859 [1931]). Corbin on Contracts, sec. 430, 
approves the holding of those cases. 
In re: Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 1954). The Roth Court explained that the reason 
for the exclusive referability requirement is to show that there was a reliance on the contract 
with a concomitant change of position, which would give rise to an estoppel. Id. If the party 
seeking protection under the Statute of Frauds admits the contract, there is no need of proof that 
the acts are exclusively referable. 
In the case before this Court, Russell does not deny that there was an agreement 
between the parties that Coulter & Smith develop the 3.67-Acres and then purchase the lots that 
it had developed. Indeed, Russell frankly admits that the Agreement memorializes Coulter & 
Smith's agreement to develop the property and then purchase the lots: 
4. On April 27, 1991,1 met with [Coulter & Smith] to discuss proposals 
of Coulter & Smith to develop and purchase the Property. 
5. At the meeting, I signed a letter prepared by [Coulter & Smith] 
memorializing my offer to sell Coulter & Smith subdivision lots to be developed 
on the Property. 
6. At the meeting, [Coulter & Smith] agreed and promised that Coulter 
& Smith would develop the Property into subdivided lots and purchase those lots 
pursuant to the Purported Option by Spring 1992. 
7. Several times subsequent to [April 27, 1991] and Spring 1992, [Coulter 
& Smith] reaffirmed to me that Coulter & Smith would subdivide the Property and 
purchase the lots by Spring 1992. 
(R. 70; Affidavit of Roger Russell, 1f4-7) (emphasis added). On the basis of Russell's 
admissions, Coulter & Smith's development activities need not be proven to be exclusively 
referable to the Agreement. 
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Moreover, there was substantial and, undisputed evidence that Coulter & Smith 
undertook substantial development activities that were exclusively referable to the Agreement. 
Coulter & Smith's evidence was that, on the basis of the Agreement alone, it had its engineers 
redesign the entire subdivision and storm drain systems to accommodate incorporation of the 
3.67-Acre Parcel into the subdivision. (R. 218-19, 19; R. 345, 112). Coulter & Smith's costs 
to re-engineer, deepen and enlarge the sewer and storm drainage systems, solely to accommodate 
development of the 3.67-Acre Parcel, were in excess of $35,000.00 (R. 345, 112).3 Coulter 
& Smith's negotiations with Sandy City and the neighbors resulted in resolution of access 
problems to the 3.67-Acre Parcel. (R. 219, 110). And the undisputed evidence was that 
Coulter & Smith would have undertaken none of these activities in the absence of the 
Agreement. (R. 219,19; R. 345, 112). Thus, Coulter & Smith's activities constituted sufficient 
part performance to take the Agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. In re: Roth's Estate, supra. 
Finally, as was observed by the Utah Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Cox, supra 
at 113, 714, the Statute of Frauds " . . . should be used for the purpose of preventing fraud, and 
not as a shield by which fraud can be perpetrated." When the advantages of an agreement are 
accepted, one cannot use the Statute of Frauds to escape the agreement's disadvantages. Id. at 
117-18, 723. Here, the undisputed evidence was that in any future development of the 3.67-
3
 Russell has correctly pointed out an error that counsel made in Coulter & Smith's Brief 
at p. 27. In fact, Coulter & Smith expended more than $35,000.00 to the sanitary and storm 
drainage systems in reliance on the Agreement, rather than the $50,000.00 figure cited by 
counsel on that page in the Brief. At R. 219, 111, Mr. Coulter attested that Coulter & Smith 
had spent more than $50,000.00 on the storm drainage system. Of that $50,000.00, Coulter & 
Smith expended an extra $35,000.00 in reliance on the Agreement ($15,000.00 to redesign and 
deepen the system, and $20,000.00 in enlarging the line and installing portions deeper). (R. 345, 
112). Coulter & Smith's counsel apologizes for the error in the Brief. 
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Acre. Russell will not only be allowed, but will be required by Sandy City to utilize the storm 
drainage and sewer systems that Coulter & Smith installed pursuant to its obligations under the 
Agreement. (R. 345-46, f 13). While Russell argues that he has paid for these improvements 
by way of the Three-Way Work Exchange Agreement (Russell's Brief, p. 22), Coulter & Smith 
has denied that the amount paid by Russell under the Three-Way Work Exchange Agreement 
was sufficient to reimburse Coulter & Smith for the extra costs required to develop the 3.67-
Acre Parcel. (R. 345, 112). If Russell contends that he fully paid for the benefits he received 
from Coulter & Smith, then this raises an obvious factual dispute that requires resolution. 
Resolution of the dispute in Coulter & Smith's favor would estop Russell from raising the Statute 
of Frauds as a defense to enforcement of the Agreement. In re Roth's Estate, supra. Thus, the 
trial court's apparent resolution of this issue in Russell's favor must be vacated, and the issue 
remanded for trial. 
In further effort to avoid performance of his contractual obligations, Russell has 
advanced a proposition which, if it were to be accepted, would throw out an entire body of Utah 
law that allows oral contracts for the sale of real property to be proven under theories of 
equitable estoppel and/or part performance. Russell's theory, based on a case from the State 
of Washington, is that a contract that fails under the Statute of Frauds can be proven only by 
a performance which "evidences the terms of the parties' agreement that should have been in 
writing. . . . " (Russell's Brief, p. 23). This theory is not law in the State of Utah. 
Cited by Russell in his brief at p. 23, the case of Berg v. Ting, 125 Wash.2d 544, 
886 P.2d 564 (1995) struck down an agreement whereby the plaintiffs, in reliance on the 
defendants' agreement to convey an easement, withdrew their opposition to the defendants' 
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proposed development plans. Though there were no allegations of fraud involved in Berg, the 
Berg court held that the agreement was barred by the Statute of Frauds, despite the fact that the 
plaintiffs had already performed their end of the bargain. The Berg court found that the Statute 
of Frauds prevented enforcement of the agreement because the plaintiff's partial performance 
"reveal[ed] nothing about the character or terms of any contract." This would not have been 
the result had a Utah court construed this contract. 
In Utah, even oral contracts for the sale of real property, in which none of the 
material terms are in writing, can be proven by part performance. This proposition is grounded 
in statute: 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of 
courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part 
performance thereof. 
U.C.A. §25-5-8 (1953, as amended) 
This statute has been construed by the Utah Supreme Court as follows: 
The doctrine of part performance in this State has not been confined to a 
fixed, inflexible formula. In Holmgren Brothers. Inc. v. Ballard, Utah, 534 P.2d 
611 (1985), the Court stated: 
The doctrine of part performance, in the state of Utah has not been 
reduced to a formula, as it has in some of our sister states. Thus, 
decisions of this court do not stay the hand of equity in the equitable 
situations created by oral contracts for the transfer of an interest in land, 
but the statute is preserved and remains to serve its purpose — the 
prevention of fraud and injustice. 
Id. at 613-14. 
Young v. Moore, 663 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1983). 
In Young, the parties had come to a agreement whereby they would exchange 
parcels of real property in order to settle a quiet title lawsuit brought because of conflicting legal 
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descriptions. Prior to execution of the written agreement, Moore proceeded with construction 
of a garage on Young's property. Thereafter, Young refused to sign the settlement agreement 
or to convey the property to Moore. Despite the fact that none of the terms of the oral contract 
were in writing, including the property description, the time for conveyance, the consideration 
to be paid, the Utah Supreme Court upheld specific enforcement of the oral agreement, finding 
that the improvements that Moore had made to the property after the oral agreement were 
sufficient part performance to specifically enforce the settlement agreement. Notably, nothing 
about Moore's improvements revealed what the consideration had been for the conveyance by 
Young to Moore. And nothing about Moore's improvements served to establish the boundaries 
of the property to which he claimed entitlement under the oral contract. While specific 
performance of the Young contract would have been denied in Washington under Berg 
principles, it was upheld in Utah, despite the fact that these critical provisions of consideration 
and legal description could not be proven by Moore's part performance. There was no fraud, 
and there were no allegations of fraud in Young. In the absence of fraud, the hand of equity 
in Utah is not stayed. 
D. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS CANNOT SERVE TO DEFEAT AN AGREEMENT 
THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH IS UNDISPUTED. 
Nor was there fraud in the case at bar, or any possible allegations of fraud. When 
there is no dispute between the parties as to what property was to be transferred and how the 
price was to be determined, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable. In this case, it is an admitted 
fact, and a finding by the trial court, that the Agreement covered the 3.67-Acre Parcel. (R. 454, 
Finding of Fact No. 1). It is an undisputed fact that the price to be paid for the 3.67-Acre 
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Parcel was $26,500 times the number of lots approved by Sandy City. Russell knows these 
terms, Coulter & Smith knows these terms, and those were the terms of the Agreement.4 
As explained above, the Statute of Frauds is not designed to prevent the 
enforcement of oral contracts that have in fact been made. It is not designed to "create a 
loophole of escape for dishonest repudiators." English v. Standard Optical Co., supra at 616. 
Russell may not avoid his contractual obligations by use of the Statute of Frauds. 
II. THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES DOES NOT BAR ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE AGREEMENT. 
In urging that the rule against perpetuities has been violated, Russell has 
disregarded the inherent inconsistency in his own argument and in the trial court's ruling. If, 
as Russell contends, any exercise of the option rights in the Agreement after the Spring of 1992 
was beyond a reasonable time, (Russell Brief, p. 31, footnote 12), or if, as the trial court found, 
a reasonable time had passed as of January 1995 (R. 456, Conclusion of Law No. 4), then the 
rule against perpetuities cannot have been violated. Both of these periods (i.e., from 1991 to 
4
 Russell has raised two new issues on appeal by arguing that there was no meeting of the 
minds as to who bore the risk in the event Sandy City adopted unfavorable zoning (Russell Brief, 
pps. 26-27), or alternatively, that the Agreement was based on a mutual mistake that zoning 
could be manipulated (Russell Brief, p. 27, footnote 9). Russell has not pointed to any fact that 
existed at the time of the parties' agreement as to which they were mistaken. Indeed, the 
evidence was clear that the parties knew they had no ultimate control over Sandy City's final 
decision, a fact that Russell has admitted at page 26, footnote 8, of his Brief. Furthermore, 
Russell's argument ignores the risk that Coulter & Smith also undertook by agreeing to the 
contingency of Sandy City's zoning decision. Coulter & Smith's development costs would 
remain substantially the same, regardless of how many lots were eventually approved. Because 
the issue was not raised below, neither party presented any evidence and no facts were 
developed as to whether the parties had discussed this contingency prior to making their 
agreement. Russell is now prohibited from making these arguments on appeal. Olson v. Park-
Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (appellate courts will not consider 
arguments that were not raised before the trial court). 
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the Spring of 1992, or from 1991 to January 1995) are well within the perpetuities period. 
Thus, there cannot have been any violation of the rule. 
Russell also ignores the development of Utah law that affects this issue, and then 
mischaracterizes Coulter & Smith's arguments (Russell Brief, p. 29, footnote 10), in his efforts 
to apply the rule against perpetuities (Russell Brief, pp. 29-31). Coulter & Smith does not 
contend that the Utah appellate courts have recently directly addressed the rule against 
perpetuities. Instead, Coulter & Smith notes that in recent years, Utah appellate courts have 
disregarded the rule against perpetuities and have gone on to uphold contracts for the transfer 
of real property interests, despite the fact that no outside period for vesting was set forth in the 
contract. Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downtown Athletic Club v. 
Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 280 (Utah App. 1987). In both of these cases, it is clear that in the 
absence of a specified time period within which vesting will take place, Utah courts will imply 
a reasonable time period under the circumstances. Bradford v. Alvev, supra at 1252; Downtown 
Athletic Club, supra at 280, fn. 3. These are much more recent cases than Fisher v. Bailey, 14 
Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985 (1963) on which Russell has relied. As Russell points out, Justice 
Crockett, in his concurrence in Fisher, observed that when specification of a definite time for 
conveyance of lots is omitted: 
. . . the law will imply that it is to be done within some such reasonable time as 
it must sensibly be supposed was contemplated by the parties. What the 
reasonable time is to be determined by looking at all of the facts and 
circumstances. That is what should be done here. The instant situation does not 
appeal to me as being in any way related to the too-long-delayed vesting of estates 
in land which the rule against perpetuities is purposed to prevent. 
Id. at 989. More than a decade and a half later, the Utah Supreme Court, in Bradford, 
completely ignored the rule against perpetuities in a real property transaction and instead settled 
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the issue by requiring the trial court to determine what constituted a reasonable time for 
performance under the circumstances. Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Downtown 
Athletic Club, almost 25 years after Fisher, also disregarded the rule against perpetuities and 
instead utilized contract principles in construing a real property transaction. Thus, contrary to 
Russell's observation, Justice Crockett's concurring opinion in Fisher has "won the day."5 
While the trial court erred in making a factual determination as to what constituted 
a reasonable time period within which Coulter & Smith could have exercised the option, if that 
time period is determined on remand to have been within the perpetuities period, then the 
Agreement, as a matter of law, could not violate the rule against perpetuities. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT MUST TAKE EVIDENCE ON WHAT 
CONSTITUTES A "REASONABLE TIME" FOR EXERCISE OF THE 
OPTION. 
In arguing that the Spring of 1992 was the outside period by which the option in 
the Agreement was to have been exercised, Russell misstates the facts. While he states that the 
"undisputed facts show that the parties intended Coulter to have completed development" by the 
Spring of 1992 (Russell Brief, p. 33), the record reveals a factual dispute over this issue. 
Coulter & Smith's evidence was that no promises were ever made about the Spring of 1992. 
(R. 219, 112). The parties knew that negotiations with adjacent landowners were delicate and 
5
 By its implied recognition that contract principles control real property transactions despite 
the rule against perpetuities, Utah joins not only California and North Carolina, (Rodin v. 
Merritt. 48 N.C.App. 64, 68; 268 S.E.2d 539, 542 (1980); Wong v. DiGrazia. 35 CaL Rptr. 
241, 247, 386 P.2d 817, 823 (1963)), but also Virginia, Rvland Group. Inc. v. Wills, 229 Va. 
459, 331 S.E.2d 399 (1985), Georgia, Young v. Cass. 225 Ga. 508, 340 S.E.2d 185 (1986), 
Kansas, Singer Co. v. Makad. Inc.. 213 Kan. 725, 518 P.2d 493 (1974), and Arizona, In Re 
Wonderfair Stores, Inc. of Arizona. 511 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1985) (construing Arizona law). 
The Ninth Circuit characterizes the position Russell has taken as a "strict, outdated approach 
rejected by the majority of jurisdictions." Id. at 1213. 
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difficult. (R. 219, f 12). The parties knew that annexation and zoning was required (R. 10, 
Agreement), and that neighborhood support for the access and zoning issues was necessary. (R 
219, if 10; R. 344, f 10). They knew that the master drain system would require enlargement, 
and that excavation, grubbing, rough grade work, and installation of water, final site grading, 
streets, curbs, and sidewalks were required. (R. 52, Three Way Work Exchange Agreement). 
The most that can be implied from these facts is that the parties hoped the development would 
be complete by the Spring of 1992. In any event, this is a factual dispute not properly resolved 
on summary judgment. 
The difficulties Coulter & Smith encountered makes it clear that the Spring of 
1992 was not a reasonable time for the development to be completed and the option to be 
exercised. In fact, Russell's continued cooperation and acquiescence after Spring 1992, 
recognizing the development difficulties, implies that he himself knew that the circumstances 
were such that development would not be completed for some time, but that the parties were 
obligated under the Agreement to continue their efforts. But Russell has made himself judge and 
jury of what constituted a reasonable time period, taking the disputed position that the option 
was definitely to have been exercised by the Spring 1992, and then unilaterally repudiating the 
Agreement in November 1992 when he was approached with what he considered to be a better 
offer. The trial court apparently did not agree with Russell that the Spring of 1992 was a 
reasonable time within which the option should have been exercised, for its finding of fact on 
the issue was that January 1995 was the relevant date. (R. 454-55, ff8-10). In making that 
improper finding, the trial court disregarded Coulter & Smith's evidence that Russell had refused 
to even discuss the project after November 1992. On summary judgment, Coulter & Smith was 
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entitled to all inferences to be drawn in its favor. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 
780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). What constitutes a reasonable time period for completion 
of the development and exercise of the option under the circumstances is the subject of a trial, 
not a summary judgment motion.6 The trial court's factual finding on this issue must be 
reversed and the matter remanded for trial. 
IV. THE AGREEMENT WAS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE CONSIDERATION. 
In arguing that the Agreement was not supported by consideration, Russell has 
overlooked his own admissions that the Agreement memorialized Coulter & Smith's agreement 
to develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel into subdivision lots, as well as the option to purchase those lots 
once developed. (R. 70, 114-7). Prior to entering into the Agreement, Coulter & Smith had 
no obligation to attempt to solve Russell's development difficulties. Prior to the Agreement, 
Coulter & Smith had no obligation to take any steps at all toward developing the 3.67-Acre 
Parcel. Contrary to Russell's characterizations, the Agreement was not a simple option to 
purchase real property, but was an agreement for Coulter & Smith to develop the 3.67-Acre 
Parcel in exchange for the option to purchase the lots once developed. Thus, Russell is incorrect 
in asserting that Coulter & Smith's promises were "likely illusory and unenforceable by 
6
 Repeatedly focusing on the fact that more than five years have elapsed since the 
Agreement was signed without Coulter & Smith's exercise of the option (Russell Brief, pps. 20-
21 and footnote 6, page 31, page 35 and footnote 13), Russell has overlooked the fact that he 
himself is one major cause of stagnation in the development. After unilaterally renouncing his 
obligations under the Agreement in November 1992, Russell has refused to even discuss 
development with Coulter & Smith, much less cooperate with Coulter & Smith in any of its 
efforts to complete the development. (R. 220, 117). While Russell points to the obstacles 
Coulter & Smith faces in developing the property (Russell Brief, pps. 20-21, footnote 6 and p. 
35, footnote 13), he disregards the fact that many of these obstacles have long since been 
overcome. Since summary judgment was improperly entered, Coulter & Smith never had an 
opportunity to present that evidence to the trial court. 
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Russell." (Russell's Brief, p. 37). Coulter & Smith's promise to develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel 
and its concomitant expenditure of more than $35,000.00 specifically because of that promise, 
constituted ample consideration for the Agreement. 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and Purchaser §35 
(1975): Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1036 (Utah 1985) (promises made to perform an act that would be detrimental to the promisor 
or beneficial to the promisee may constitute the consideration for a contract). 
Moreover, even if Coulter & Smith's promises to Russell were considered to be 
inadequate consideration, this is a factual issue requiring resolution by the trial court. Russell 
denies that Coulter & Smith's actions were of benefit to him. Coulter & Smith's evidence was 
directly to the contrary, evidencing substantial benefit to Russell. Russell argues that Coulter 
& Smith's acts were merely "beginning preparations" insufficient to support a claim of 
promissory estoppel. (Russell's Brief, pp. 37-38). But Russell's own authority, Knight v. 
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 22 Wash. App. 493, 589 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1979) acknowledges that 
the distinction between what constitutes (1) beginning preparations for performance and (2) 
tender of part of actual performance is a factual one, and is not always clear: 
The distinction turns on many factors: 
the extent to which the offeree's conduct is clearly referable to the offer, 
the definite and substantial character of that conduct, and the extent to 
which it is of actual or prospective benefit to the offeror rather than the 
offeree, as well as the terms of the communications between the parties, 
for their prior course of dealing, and any relevant usages of trade. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §45 comment/(Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1964). 
Knight v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 589 P.2d at 1282. Thus, each situation must be examined 
on an individual factual basis. 
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Applying these factors to the case before this Court, Coulter & Smith's actions 
taken to develop the 3.67-Acre Parcel would never have been taken in the absence of the 
Agreement, thus they are clearly referable to the Agreement. By expending more than 
$35,000.00 of its own money in expanding the sewer and storm drainage system solely to 
accommodate the 3.67-Acre Parcel, Coulter & Smith's actions cannot be said to have been other 
than of a definite and substantial character. Russell himself has acknowledged that the expansion 
of the sewer and storm drainage system will eventually be of benefit to him when a sewer line 
is developed between the 3.67-Acre Parcel and the enlarged system Coulter & Smith installed. 
(R. 262, f6). Russell's acknowledgement is in accord with Coulter & Smith's testimony that 
Russell will be required by Sandy City to utilize the expanded sewer and storm drainage system. 
(R. 345-46, 113). Thus, Coulter & Smith's actions were of actual and/or prospective benefit 
to Russell. While Russell denies that he was benefitted, or that Coulter & Smith's actions were 
of any definite or substantial character, he is wrong. In any event, these are factual issues to 
be resolved by the trial court. At trial, Coulter & Smith is entitled to prove its part performance 
of its obligations under the terms of the Agreement, and is entitled to a ruling that its part-
performance estops Russell from denying his obligations.7 
Russell's argument that he is entitled to recession rests on his mischaracterization of the 
facts that the parties "intended" that all conditions to have been met by the Spring of 1992. As 
set forth above, there is a factual dispute as to whether the parties "intended" or only "hoped" 
that the development be completed by that time. As a matter of law, this dispute cannot be 
resolved on summary judgment. Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P. Moreover, rescission requires that the 
parties be placed in the position that they were in prior to the contract having been made. 50 
W. Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1170 (Utah 1989). Rescission would 
require that Russell restore to Coulter & Smith all of the benefits Russell received and make 
Coulter & Smith whole for all of the detriment Coulter & Smith suffered. This raises a whole 
plethora of factual disputes that will require resolution by the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reverse the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. 
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